Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

This study centers on Hume's discussion of the relation of reason and the passions in Book III, Part I, section I of the Treatise and related passages. Hume's central arguments are carefully laid out and are found to rest on unwarranted premisses. Making use of the distinctions suggested by Baier, Ryle, and other modern writers, Broiles questions Hume's thesis that reason plays no direct role in ethics, and further suggests that a failure to distinguish explanatory or exciting reasons from (...) justifying reasons leads Hume to an incorrect conception of the nature of motives. Hume's relation to the earlier British moralists is also treated, and the famous "is-ought" passage is given a fresh interpretation.—A. F. G. (shrink)

Working within the framework of Ryle's "knowing how-knowing that" distinction, Hartland-Swann argues that all knowing involves a decision and that "knowing that" is a special case of "knowing how": knowing how to say what is the case.--R. F. T.

A persuasive attack on Ryle's notion that "remember" is an achievement verb, and on Russell's view that all acts of memory might be entirely misleading. Although we can never be sure in any particular case that our memories are veridical, we need not adopt total scepticism. The book suffers from awkwardness of style and unnecessary repetition.--F. W. N.

Van Peursen’s book is an authorized translation and is published under the auspices of the Duquesne Philosophical Series. The purpose of the work is to effect a rapprochement between two of today’s most notable approaches to philosophy: phenomenology and linguistic analysis. These respective philosophical methods are frequently looked upon as two of the conspicuous polar trends within contemporary philosophy, and the author arranges their confrontation in such a way that their most fundamental convergencies and divergencies are revealed. The original phase (...) of phenomenology, that of Edmund Husserl, and the earlier phase of logical positivism as represented by Carnap and Schlick, are described by focusing on their treatment of the problem of meaning. A further comparison is made between the respective ways phenomenological reduction and analytical reduction treat the question of factual existence. Both philosophical methods are presented clearly and sympathetically in their historical depth and with emphasis on their methodological aspects. The author then makes a provisional confrontation between them which centers on the critical problem of defining the appropriate relation between operational and intuitive meaning, the truths of reason and the truths of fact. These two methods of philosophy stem from essentially different attitudes whose significance transcends the limits of philosophy, and one of Van Peursen’s purposes is to explain both schools of thought to a wider public. He then traces the further development of phenomenology through the later Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, while concentrating on the phenomenology of the ego and of the Life-World. This analysis is followed by a description of the movement from logical positivism to analytical philosophy as it was shaped by the linguistic orientation of Wittgenstein and Ryle. The last chapter offers a final confrontation between the transcendental and the linguistic approaches. (shrink)

Professor Vendler’s book is a notable recent addition to the Cornell Contemporary Philosophy Series, and it attempts to develop a more adequate, but still distinctly rationalistic, Cartesian perspective on ideas, thought, and speech by using the techniques of generative linguistics and of analytical philosophy. Initially, he elucidates the relationship between speech and thought by demonstrating that the former is an expression of the latter. He then distinguishes between the subjective and objective dimensions of thought by concentrating particularly on the concepts (...) of belief and knowledge. These analyses are followed by an acute inquiry into the learning and understanding of speech by reference to the native and acquired elements of knowledge. His investigations culminate in an explicit rejection of all forms of empiricism and behaviorism in philosophical psychology, most particularly the influential view propounded by Ryle in Concept of Mind. Furthermore, Professor Vendler’s study extends some insights of J. L. Austin, and he finds Wittgenstein’s understanding of language and speech to be incorrect because our knowledge of what a word means is "a function of, and is to be explained in terms of, understanding certain incomplete propositions.". (shrink)

It is a curious thing about the philosophy of mind, that it includes surprisingly little about minds. In an average anthology on the subject, or a book like Ryle's, one finds discussions of thinking, imagining, believing, willing, remembering, and so on, but not of minds. It seems to be assumed that investigating these topics is investigating minds; but whether that is true is not itself made a topic for investigation.

What are mental images? Traditionally, philosophers have taken them to be representations of a certain kind. In common with all representations, they are seen as the kinds of thing that can be coloured, noisy, odorous, palpable or tasty, depending upon what they are representations of. But, in The Concept of Mind, Professor Ryle argues that this view of mental imagery is incoherent. Anything, he says, that really is coloured or noisy and so on, must, in principle, be locatable, which (...) mental images are not. He concludes that they cannot be the kinds of thing that the traditional view asserts them to be. Indeed, he goes further: he maintains that everything that exists has at least one of the properties mentioned in the above list and that, since mental images fail in this regard, they do not exist.Unfortunately, Professor Ryle's arguments in support of his contention that mental images are unlocatable are not conclusive. He assumes that if one can show that mental images are not locatable in ordinary space, they are not locatable in principle. (shrink)

During the early 19th century, a peculiarly systematic way of organizing books emerged in Germany. This systematization, which purported to be a rational organization of subject matter, was an outgrowth of the philosophy of Hegel. This article attempts to outline Hegel's organizational practice. It argues that Hegel's encyclopedia was a reaction against the Enlightenment encyclopedia, and that it attempted to restore the systematic mindset of pre-modern reference books. Yet it did this, not in a straightforward fashion, but by developing a (...) method for organizing material that both stresses the interconnectedness of knowledge and promises to be highly scalable. In its attempt to trace the Hegelian organizational method, this article revisits and calls attention to a forgotten work in Hegel scholarship by Michael John Petry, who was the first writer to seriously stress the importance of classification in Hegel's work. This article is an attempt to demonstrate that Hegelianism and information organization can be brought into fruitful and mutually beneficial dialogue. (shrink)

A short account of the genesis and present state of English linguistic philosophy. Warnock looks briefly at the metaphysicians at the turn of the century, and then goes through the work of Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Ryle, to that of Austin and Strawson. The book is mainly expository, and includes chapters on logic and metaphysics as these are related to linguistic philosophy. Sometimes Warnock's style is as mannered as it is lucid, but it is lucid nevertheless; a fine introduction (...) to linguistic philosophy --B. N. F. (shrink)

The title of this symposium, “Formal Simplicity as a Weight in the Acceptability of Scientific Theories,” to some people might seem to suggest that we are to be making positive proposals about how the concept of simplicity could be defined for formalized languages, defined so as to figure in a formalized theory of confirmation. I must confess at the start that I do not have any such ambitious object in view. I now feel, indeed, that premature formalizations have little power (...) to illuminate the philosophically interesting questions which cluster round the problem of the role of simplicity in scientific thinking. So in this short paper I wish merely to present some elementary considerations, not very novel ones, concerning the role which simplicity seems to me to play in our non-demonstrative reasoning about matters of empirical fact. Although many writers have sought to analyze the logical character of such reasoning, little unanimity has been attained in their over-all views; thus it is that though the considerations which I wish to present are elementary, they are not wholly uncontroversial. But because these matters are elementary in nature, I do feel it appropriate in discussing them to use homely examples of uncomplicated kinds, rather than elaborate examples drawn from the more sophisticated reaches of scientific theory; in doing so, I am taking it for granted that scientific inference as regards its logical character is fundamentally a refinement of everyday thinking, rather than a procedure of some essentially different nature. (shrink)

В книге анализируется дискуссия о природе сознания в современной аналитической философии. Для философов, ученых и всех, интересующихся проблемой сознания.

Critics of the computational connectionism of the last decade suggest that it shares undesirable features with earlier empiricist or associationist approaches, and with behaviourist theories of learning. To assess the accuracy of this charge the works of earlier writers are examined for the presence of such features, and brief accounts of those found are given for Herbert Spencer, William James and the learning theorists Thorndike, Pavlov and Hull. The idea that cognition depends on associative connections among large networks of neurons (...) is indeed one with precedents, although the implications of this for psychological issues have been interpreted variously — not all versions of connectionism are alike. (shrink)

In research employing animals we commonly do things to them which would be grossly immoral to do to humans. This paper discusses three possible justifications for so treating animals: (a) it is violating the autonomy of rational beings which makes actions immoral, and animals are not autonomous; (b) due to our participation in the human community, we have special obligations to humans that we do not have to animals; and (c) human life is morally more worthy than animal life. The (...) conclusion of this discussion is that none of these three propositions justifies the routine sacrifice of animal interests for human benefit. Particular attention is paid to the idea that human life is morally more worthy than animal life, because I believe that to be the most common justification for our sacrifice of animal interests in research. The claim of greater worth is considered and criticized from both utilitarian and Kantian perspectives, and the inference from superior worth to being entitled to exploit one's inferiors is also criticized. The paper concludes by recommending a governing principle for research with animals which would bring that research into line with the rejection of hierarchical worldviews, social orders, and value systems which characterizes modern moral progress. Keywords: animal rights, animal research, moral worth, moral superiority, moral community, fairness CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

In recent writing on the theory of knowledge a distinction has been drawn between ‘the language of appearing’ and ‘the sense-datum language’. The aim of this paper is to suggest that consideration of that distinction and of what Kant’s attitude toward it would have been can shed light on two otherwise-puzzling aspects of his doctrine in the Critique of Pure Reason: his adamant conviction that there are things-in-themselves, and his confidence that the Antinomies are resolved once we admit the transcendental (...) ideality of space and time. (shrink)